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Introduction
International humanitarian law, the “law of armed conflict,” dictates international rules
which govern the conduct of hostilities and punishable acts.1 International humanitarian law
serves to provide “rules in place defining acceptable behavior in armed conflict.”2 In order to
promote justice for the most amount of people during armed conflict, international humanitarian
law provides a check on the crimes and conduct committed during armed conflict. International
humanitarian law provides protection to all people, ensuring that even when there is a time of
armed conflict, individuals do not act as though it is a free-for-all. There are still limits to
conduct that can be done and potential crimes that can be committed, thus promoting a theory of
justice. The potential prosecution of severe and heinous international crimes assists in delivering
justice to victims. Specifically, “investigations and trials of powerful leaders (whether political or
military) help strengthen the rule of law and send a strong signal that such crimes will not be
tolerated in a rights-respecting society.”3 Further, “trials remain a key demand of victims. When
conducted in ways that reflect victims’ needs and expectations, they can play a vital role in
restoring their dignity and delivering justice.”4
International humanitarian law protects the general population from crimes committed
during armed conflict. Additionally, international humanitarian law also informs individuals and
leaders of acceptable and unacceptable actions and conduct during war time. This international
system provides examples of individuals’ and leaders’ conduct that can be committed during
armed conflict, and conduct that may constitute a crime.
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As I will discuss in this paper, international tribunals and courts can indict individuals for
war crimes. To determine individual criminal responsibility for offenses of international
humanitarian law, contemporary courts have maintained that war crimes are international
humanitarian law offenses that have been criminalized.5 Plainly, war crimes are violations of the
law of war that has been criminalized.6 To qualify as a war crime, the conduct or crime must
occur within an armed conflict, and the conduct or crime must have a sufficient nexus to the
armed conflict. However, the definition and application of the nexus requirement varies.
International tribunals have used at times narrow or at times broad interpretations and
applications of the nexus requirement. In some instances of war crime indictments, international
tribunals use a narrow interpretation of the nexus requirement. These tribunals have held that the
nexus requirement must be a direct and definite link between the crime or conduct and the armed
conflict. However, on the other hand, international tribunals have also held on other occasions
that the nexus requirement should require a broader and more fluid application, considering and
balancing many factors.
Preliminary Statement of the Issue
In determining whether a war crime has occurred, tribunals must determine whether there
is a nexus between the conduct or crime and the armed conflict. The issue discussed in this paper
will be whether the nexus requirement should be narrowly or broadly interpreted and applied. As
you will see throughout this paper, I advocate for a broader and more fluid meaning and
application of the nexus requirement. The nexus requirement, in regards to war crimes, should
not be narrowly considered and applied. An example of narrow application of the nexus
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requirement includes an international tribunal requiring the prosecution to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that there exists a direct and definite link between conduct or a crime and an
armed conflict. This is an example of a narrow application because the link between the conduct
and the armed conflict must be direct and definite. This type of application is strict and does not
allow for a more lenient definition and application of the nexus requirement.
Limiting the nexus requirement and only permitting a narrow interpretation limits the
scope of crimes that can be considered war crimes. The nexus requirement should be relaxed and
applied broadly to allow for adjudication of serious or severe crimes to be classified as war
crimes. This will help further strengthen the notion that certain crimes will not be tolerated in a
rights-respecting society, furthering the goal of international humanitarian law. Relaxing the
standard would allow for more opportunities for harmed groups to receive justice for heinous
actions committed against them, even under the perpetrator’s guise that it was acceptable
because it was during an armed conflict.
Alternatively, the opposing view to my argument would be that the nexus requirement
should remain narrow and should not be applied more broadly. This view would suggest that the
nexus requirement should remain narrow and should be applied narrowly. An advocate for this
approach may support the position with the reasoning that a narrow nexus requirement ensures
that the prosecution of war crimes remains serious and somewhat specific. A concern about
expanding the definition of the nexus requirement may include that a broadening would lessen
the seriousness of the definition of war crime. This advocate may say that the narrow application
of the nexus requirement ensures that only serious crimes are prosecuted as war crimes since
there is a strict and narrow standard the prosecution must meet. Further, this advocate may
suggest that broadening the definition of the nexus requirement may broaden or expand the
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definition of a war crime too far. We will continue to discuss and outline potential pushback later
in this paper.
Problem
In order to classify conduct as a war crime, as followed by Prosecutor v. Clement
Kayishema7, a prosecutor must prove the nexus between the conduct and the armed conflict
beyond a reasonable doubt. 8 Specifically, the prosecution must show that there is a “direct
connection between the alleged crimes referred to the Indictment, and the armed conflict …
established factually.”9 However, this type of narrow formulation in regards to the nexus
definition does not necessarily lead to results of justice. Developing a more fluid nexus test, such
as the nexus tests used in Prosecutor v. Kunarac and Prosecutor v. Semanza, would undoubtably
change the opportunity for justice. A broader nexus test may allow for an increase in
opportunities of justice. Since cases would not immediately fail upon trying to meet the nexus
requirement, this broader requirement may potentially open the door to further opportunities of
justice and adjudication. The narrow application of the nexus requirement in some cases severely
impacts the administration of justice, as exemplified by Prosecutor v. Clement Kayishema.
Thesis Statement
In regards to war crimes, the nexus requirement should be broadened and extended
beyond a direct connection between the alleged crimes and the armed conflict. The nexus
requirement for war crimes varies. Although there is not necessarily a bright-line rule in regards
to defining the nexus requirement, the definition and application generally rely on a narrow
standard. This narrow standard, as we have seen, can negatively impact the outcome of cases.
7
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There should be a broader test and standard for the nexus requirement in determining whether a
war crime has occurred. The current narrow standard, which is implemented most often, is too
narrow.
Roadmap
In order to show why I believe international tribunals should utilize a broader and more
fluid application of the nexus requirement, my paper will include an in-depth analysis of the
nexus requirement. First, I will provide some initial background information into armed conflict.
This will include the definition of armed conflict and the criteria that tribunals use to determine if
an armed conflict exists. Then, I will provide some initial background information into the
definition of the nexus requirement. I will explain how sometimes tribunals have narrowly
applied the nexus requirement, and I will explain how sometimes tribunals have used a broader
application of the nexus requirement. In this introductory section I will also explain the function
of the nexus requirement.
In the next section of my paper, I will provide a detailed explanation and analysis of the
narrow applications of the nexus requirement. This will include examples and explanations of
times international tribunals have narrowly defined and applied the nexus requirement. In this
portion of my paper, I will use examples to show how the tribunals’ use of the narrow
application of the nexus requirement can be detrimental to achieving justice. In this section I will
explain how a narrow interpretation of the nexus requirement usually includes a direct and
definite link between the conduct or crime and the armed conflict. I will show how the
international tribunals’ reliance on this narrow interpretation of the nexus requirement often too
severely limits what constitutes a war crime under international law.
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Next, in the following section, I will discuss the broader applications of the nexus
requirement in determining if a war crime has occurred. I will use cases and examples to show
times that international tribunals have defined and applied the nexus requirement more broadly. I
will explain how these broader and more detailed descriptions and applications of the nexus
requirement allow for a greater opportunity of justice. I will show how the balancing of many
factors to determine if there is a nexus between the conduct or crime and an armed conflict
allows for more cases to be adjudicated and potentially charged as a war crime.
In the next section of my paper, I will discuss potential pushback and potential drawbacks
of a broader application of the nexus requirement. I will discuss that opponents to my thesis may
suggest that expanding and broadening the definition and application of the nexus requirement
would broaden the definition too far. I will also discuss that opponents may suggest that
broadening the definition could have a potential effect on the seriousness of prosecuting war
crimes.
Finally, I will conclude my paper with final thoughts and a summary of my argument.
The goal of my paper is to show that in regards to war crimes, the nexus requirement should be
broadened and extended beyond a direct connection between the alleged crimes and armed
conflict. Further, the nexus requirement should instead include a multitude of factors to be
balanced.
Analysis
In order to begin the analysis portion of this paper, I will first discuss initial background
information into war crimes and armed conflict. To qualify as a war crime, conduct must be
committed within an armed conflict and have a sufficient connection – or nexus – to the armed
conflict. Under Tadic, an armed conflict “exists whenever there is a resort to armed force
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between States or protracted armed violence between governmental authorities or organized
armed groups or between such groups within a state.”10 Specifically, two criteria emerge for
armed conflicts: (1) the intensity of the conflict, and (2) the organization of the parties of the
conflict, as a way to distinguish an armed conflict “from banditry, unorganized or short-lived
insurrections, or terrorist activities, which are not subject to international humanitarian law.”11
The factors for determining intensity include, but are not limited to: (1) the seriousness of
the attacks, (2) whether there has been an increase in armed clashes, (3) the spread of clashes
over the territory and over a period of time, (4) any increase in the number of government forces
and mobilization, (5) the distribution of weapons among both parties to the conflict, (6) whether
the conflict has attracted the attention of the United Nations Security Council, and (7) whether
any resolutions on the matter have been passed.12
Further, the organization requirement is determined by a number of factors, including: (1)
factors signaling the presence of a command structure, (2) factors indicating that the group could
carry out operations in an organized manner, (3) factors indicating a level of logistics, (4) factors
relevant to determining whether an armed group possessed a level of discipline and the ability to
implement basic obligations of Common Article 3, and (5) factors indicating that the armed
group was able to speak with one voice.13
In order for conduct to be categorized as a violation in which international criminal law
applies to violence of armed forces, there must be a “sufficient nexus between the conduct at
issue and the relevant armed conflict.”14 The nexus requirement “serves to distinguish war

Schaak & Slye, supra note 1, at 331.
Prosecutor v. Boškoski & Tarčulovski, IT-04-82-T, Judgement para. 175 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia (July 10, 2008).
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crimes from purely domestic crimes over which international criminal courts and tribunals have
no jurisdiction.”15 Further, the nexus requirement distinguishes war crimes from ordinary
criminal conduct. 16 Specifically, this nexus requirement acts to establish a connection between
the conduct of the individual or group and a violation of international humanitarian law. 17
However, tribunals differ on their definition and application of the nexus requirement. While
some tribunals narrowly apply the nexus requirement, demanding a direct link between the
conduct and the armed conflict, other tribunals broaden the definition and application. The
broadened definition and application of the nexus requirement allows for a wider scope of
activity and conduct to be categorized as war crimes in the international community.
Regardless of whether tribunals adopt and apply a broad or a narrow definition of the
nexus requirement, the function of the nexus requirement is a matter of public debate. While
some commentators believe the nexus requirement should be utilized and treated as an
independent requirement for a war crime charge, other commentators support the notion that the
nexus requirement works as a trigger of the application of international humanitarian law.18
The nexus requirement is best understood as “triggering the application of international
humanitarian law to particular acts of misconduct by individual defendants.”19 The purpose is
most commonly explained as holding individual defendants accountable for harmful misconduct.
This purpose extends to holding individual defendants accountable on an international scale.
Furthermore, the crime and action must actually violate the law of war, and the inquiry begins as
to whether the accused party has committed a violation under international humanitarian law.
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Additionally, there is a consensus that “the fact that an abuse would not have occurred but for the
existence of an armed conflict is not sufficient to make an act a war crime.”20 For example, if an
officer harms a subordinate during an armed conflict, but the harm is unrelated to the armed
conflict, this would not satisfy the requirement. Just because the officer had the opportunity and
was exposed to the subordinate because of the armed conflict, does not mean this satisfies the
requirement. The officer may not have been exposed to the subordinate but for the armed
conflict. The armed conflict may have provided the officer with the opportunity to both meet and
harm the subordinate. However, this does not mean that the connection is sufficient to show the
action constitutes a war crime. This is not enough to show a nexus requirement. In this case, the
requirement would not be satisfied.
With that being said, the nexus requirement is not always defined or applied in the same
way. International tribunals at times use narrow applications and at times use broader
applications of the nexus requirement. In the next section, I will discuss the narrow applications
of the nexus requirement.
Narrow Applications of the Nexus Requirement
Now that the relevant background information to war crimes, armed conflict, and the
nexus requirement have been discussed, I will now review narrow applications of the nexus
requirement. Some international tribunals use a narrow and specific nexus requirement, looking
for a direct and definite link between the perpetrator’s conduct and armed conflict. Specifically,
in Prosecutor v. Kayishema, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda used a narrow
application of the nexus requirement when determining whether a war crime had occurred.
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The Trial Chamber II of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda was established
by the United Nations Security Council Resolution 955 on November 8, 1994.21 The Security
Council established the Tribunal in response to “widespread violations of international law
committed in Rwanda” which constituted a “threat to international peace and security.”22
At the time, two groups in Rwanda, the Tutsis and the Hutus, were experiencing tension
and power struggles within the country as a result of “manipulation of these ethnic identities by
the colonial and post-colonial powers.”23 Members of the Tutsi population were forced to flee
from Rwanda upon experiencing extreme violence from the Hutu population.24 As a result,
members of the Tutsi population formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (“RPF”). The RPF acted as
a Tutsi resistance group to the ongoing Hutu domination.25 Although the Arusha Accords
attempted to achieve multiple cease-fires, the RPF began launching attacks against the Hutu
government powers from neighboring countries.26 In response to the Tutsi and RPF efforts to
attack the Hutu powers, Hutu political groups began forming and training pseudo-military
units.27
On April 6, 1994, Rwandan President Juvenal Habyarimana’s plane was shot down by a
pair of surface-to-air missiles.28 Although the identity of the assassins is unknown, the
assassination led to an end of the ceasefire, and the massacre of the Tutsi people began. Tutsi
civilians began congregating in churches to protect themselves. However, members of the
national police, commune police, and armed civilians began massacring the Tutsi population
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with machetes and other agricultural tools in the churches and otherwise neutral and safe
locations.29
In response to the massacre of the Tutsi people, the International Criminal Tribunal of
Rwanda (“ICTR”) indicted Clement Kayishema and Obed Ruzindana for war crimes in
connection with massacres at four main sites, among other indictments.30 Kayishema argued that
“the acts for which he was charged did not constitute war crimes because they were unconnected
with the war between the RPF and the Hutu-led government.”31
Relying on Prosecutor v. Zejnil and Prosecutor v. Tadic, the ICTR held that:
The term nexus should not be understood as something vague and
indefinite. A direct connection between the alleged crimes referred
to the Indictment, and the armed conflict should be established
factually. No test, therefore, can be defined in abstracto. It is for the
Trial Chamber, on a case-by-case basis to adjudge on the facts
submitted as to whether a nexus existed. It is incumbent upon the
Prosecution to present those facts and to prove, beyond a reasonable
doubt, that such nexus exists.32
The ICTR held that there must be a direct and definite link between the alleged crime and the
armed conflict. Further, the ICTR found that the Prosecutor did not meet the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt - to show that the crimes alleged in the Indictment “were committed
in direct conjunction with the armed conflict.”33 The lack of direct evidence presented by the
Prosecutor in regards to the nexus element allowed the Tribunal to rule that Kayishema and
Ruzindana could not be held liable for war crimes. Ultimately, in this case, Kayishema and
Ruzindana did not incur criminal responsibility or liability for war crimes.

29

Id. at 329-30.
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In this particular case, the ICTR viewed the nexus requirement strictly and narrowly.
Since the Prosecutor failed to show a direct and definite link between the Defendants’ actions
and the specific armed conflict, the ICTR refused to hold the Defendants criminally responsible
for their conduct. This case provides an example and representation of the narrow test for nexus
requirement. In cases where tribunals use this narrow application for the nexus requirement, the
Prosecution must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, there exists a direct and definite link
between the alleged crime or conduct and the armed conflict. This is a narrow interpretation and
application which removes the possibility of a successful war crime charge if the nexus element
is not met. In these indictments, if the Prosecution does not meet the nexus standard, the war
crime case against Defendants is thrown away completely.
As the research included reflects, the ICTR may have relied too heavily on the narrow
interpretation of the nexus requirement. Developing and utilizing a broader definition and
application of the nexus requirement could allow for a more expansive definition of war crimes.
For example, in the case of Prosecutor v. Kayishema, the Prosecutor made attempts to show a
nexus between the Defendants’ conduct and armed conflict. Specifically, the Prosecutor made
reference to “in the context of non-international armed conflict.”34 Although the Prosecutor did
not specify the meaning of the words, the Tribunal found the words to be “too general in
character” and found that the words “[did] not clarify the situation in a proper way.”35 As a
result, the Tribunal concluded that: “When the country is in a state of armed conflict, crimes
committed in this period of time could be considered as having been committed in the context of

34
35

Id.
Id.

12

this conflict. However, it does not mean that all such crimes have a direct link with the armed
conflict.”36
The ICTR was able to make the nexus determination on the basis of the lack of a direct
link between the conduct or crime committed and the armed conflict. Additionally, the ICTR
found the Prosecutor’s proof to not meet the burden of proof necessary to convict for war crimes.
There are issues with this specific determination. For example, the Prosecutor’s burden of proof
did involve further evidence beyond “in the context.” The Prosecutor did explain contextually
what was occurring within Rwanda during this time, as well as the Defendants’ involvement
with the country’s ongoing present conflict and violent environment. By considering and
understanding all relevant facts, one could determine that the Defendants’ conduct was causally
connected to the ongoing armed conflict in Rwanda. However, using the direct and narrow
application of the nexus requirement, the Tribunal determined that the Prosecutor did not provide
enough evidence to meet the beyond a reasonable doubt standard.
Another point to consider is the obvious facts a reasonable person could gather from the
Kayishema case. A reasonable person would likely look at the facts of this case and assume and
have sincere reason to believe the Defendants’ actions were motivated by the ongoing armed
conflict between the Tutsi and the Hutu people. Any reasonable person taking a step back from
the law would read the set of facts in the case, understand the political and cultural conflict
taking place in Rwanda, and likely come to the realization and judgement that the Defendants’
crimes in this case were directly related to the ongoing armed conflict. This is why such a narrow
and strict test becomes problematic for these types of determinations. The results of a case may
deviate from an obvious understanding of the events that took place. In the tribunal’s attempt to
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comply with a strict and narrow interpretation of the nexus requirement, the tribunal may forgo a
more just and obvious result. This can lead the tribunal to make a decision on a case that they
would have otherwise continued to review and consider as a war crime, merely because the case
does not fit the narrow nexus requirement.
The tribunal making a judgement about the nexus requirement based on a limited and
narrow scope provides the Prosecutor with a near-impossible obstacle to overcome. Especially in
cases like Kayishema, where there is a severe and tragic slaughter of the Tutsi people, it is hard
to understand how the Tribunal did not reach a conclusion that the inhumane slaughter was
related to and likely motivated by and closely related to the Rwandan conflict. Crimes like those
committed by the Defendants in Kayishema seem emotionally and culturally motivated to any
reasonable person. It can seem as though the Tribunal only made the finding it did because the
nexus requirement was not met with the very specific and narrow nexus application used. This is
the problem with the narrow application of the nexus requirement being limited to a direct and
definite link between the conduct or crime committed and the armed conflict.
In regards to the indictment on war crimes, this case may have had a different result if the
Tribunal considered the nexus requirement differently. The entire case and its result rested on
this determination, which could be damning as we saw in this case. Future cases relying on this
precedent will have to stop inquiry and analysis once it is determined there is not a direct and
definite nexus between the perpetrator’s conduct and the armed conflict. This nexus definition
and application should be relaxed to an extent to allow for more potential justice and further
adjudication. The inquiry into guilt for war crimes should not rest on this direct and definite link.
Tribunals should relax this necessary connection to allow for the further adjudication of cases
that may otherwise fit the credentials for a war crime.
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In another example, the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda uses alternative
formulations of the required nexus element on a case-by-case basis. For example, in Prosecutor
v. Semanza, the Trial Chamber found that the nexus requirement relies on whether the conduct
was either “closely related to the hostilities” or “committed in conjunction with them.”37
However, the Semanza Chamber ultimately followed Kayishema’s narrow interpretation of the
nexus requirement.
In a slightly different approach, the Akayesu Trial Chamber found that only acts
“committed in conjunction with the armed conflict” will qualify as war crimes.38 In Prosecutor v.
Akayesu, the Trial Chamber ultimately held that “it [was not] proven beyond reasonable doubt
that the acts perpetrated by Akayesu … were committed in conjunction with the armed
conflict.”39 Ultimately, the Tribunal found that Akayesu did not incur criminal responsibility for
the Indictment. Although once again the tribunal uses different language in regards to the nexus
requirement for this specific Indictment, when examining the judgment in its totality, it is clear
the tribunal is following a similar nexus requirement to that of Kayishema.
Although the Semanxza and Akayesu rulings use different language within their
judgements, the test for the nexus requirement closely parallels and mirrors the Kayishema nexus
test. Although Semanxza and Akayesu at first glance have differing language from Kayishema to
explain the nexus requirement, both tribunal rulings ultimately rely on the Kayishema nexus
application in their final judgements. These tests are practically and ultimately the same, and in
all three rulings the tribunal comes to very similar results utilizing this similar nexus application.
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As shown in this section, the narrow application of the nexus requirement severely limits
cases that constitute war crimes. In the next section, I will discuss broader and alternative
applications of the nexus requirement, using examples and approaches.
Alternative Applications of the Nexus Requirement
As I have shown in the last section, international tribunals have at times used narrow
definitions and applications of the nexus requirement when determining if a war crime has been
committed. However, international tribunals at times use broader applications of the nexus
requirement to make this determination.
To determine whether a nexus between the crime and an armed conflict has been found,
the international tribunal will evaluate the nexus in regards to a particular act.40 In Prosecutor v.
Kunarac, three Serbian military officials were prosecuted for alleged war crimes. The three
officials were prosecuted for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in
the Foca territory of the former Yugoslavia.41 In this particular case, the Appeals Chamber found
that the casual relationship and nexus requirement was not necessary.42 Specifically, the
Chamber found:
What ultimately distinguishes a war crime from a purely domestic
offense is that a war crime is shaped by or dependent upon the
environment in which it is committed…The armed conflict need not
have been causal to the commission of the crime, but the existence
of an armed conflict must, at a minimum, have played a substantial
part in the perpetrator’s ability to commit it, his decision to commit
it, the manner in which it was committed, or the purpose for which
it was committed. 43

40

Id.
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgement (June 12, 2002).
42
Schaak & Slye, supra note 1, at 280.
43
Kunarac, supra note 40.
41
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Further, the Kunarac Chamber held that in determining if the nexus requirement is met, the Trial
Chamber may take into account the following factors:
(1) the fact that the perpetrator is a combatant; (2) the fact that the
victim is a non-combatant; (3) the fact that the victim is a member
of the opposing party; (4) the fact that the act may be said to serve
the ultimate goal of a military campaign; (5) and the fact that the
crime is committed as part of or in the context of the perpetrator’s
official duties.44
Ultimately, the Kunarac Chamber found that the Trial Chamber had “identified and
applied the proper test for establishing the required nexus between the acts of the accused and the
attack.”45 The Kunarac Chamber did not rely on a direct and definite link as a nexus between the
accused’s conduct and the armed conflict. Instead, the Chamber considered a number of factors
when determining whether or not a nexus existed. The nexus requirement in Kunarac rested
more heavily on the armed conflict and its influence on the perpetrator’s ability and decision to
commit the crime. The tribunal in Kunarac examined multiple factors to determine whether a
nexus existed.
This broad and more detailed description and application of the nexus requirement allows
for a greater opportunity for justice. The nexus requirement, under Kunarac, balances armed
conflict with motives and abilities. This type of nexus requirement allows more room for
adjudication because it is not as black and white as the narrower interpretation of the nexus
requirement used in Kayishema. Specifically, the case is not ultimately ruled out because one
requirement is not met. There is more room and ability for the Prosecutor to show there is a
nexus, and there is not a heightened burden of proof which requires proving a direct connection

44
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Kunarac, supra note 40.
Id.
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beyond a reasonable doubt. Under this nexus requirement, more cases can continue without
automatically ending due to a lack of nexus requirement.
Furthermore, the Appeals Chamber in Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, further elaborates on the
Kunarac nexus application. In Rutaganda, the Indictment charged Rutaganda with participating
in crimes committed in Rwanda, including murder.46 The Trial Chamber acquitted Rutaganda on
the ground that the “Prosecution failed to establish the required nexus beyond a reasonable
doubt.47 The Trial Chamber found that the Prosecution did not show how the individual acts of
Rutaganda during the massacres were committed in conjunction with the armed conflict.48
However, the Appeals Chamber disagreed and found that the Prosecution met the nexus
requirement.49
Specifically, the Rutaganda Appeals Chamber held that:
It is only necessary to explain two matters. First, the expression
‘under the guise of the armed conflict” does not mean simply ‘at the
same time as an armed conflict’ and/or ‘in any circumstances
created in part by the armed conflict.’ For example, if a noncombatant takes advantage of the lessened effectiveness of the
police in conditions of disorder created by an armed conflict to
murder a neighbor he has hated for years, that would not, without
more, constitute a war crime … By contrast, the accused in Kunarac,
for example, were combatants who took advantage of their positions
of military authority to rape individuals whose displacement was an
express goal of the military campaign in which they took part.
Second … the determination of a close relationship between
particular offenses and an armed conflict will usually require
consideration of several factors, not just one.50

Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR-96-3-A, Judgement, para. 558 (May 26, 2003).
Id.
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The Rutaganda Chamber found that the nexus application requires a consideration of several
factors. The determination of whether a nexus between conduct and armed conflict is found
depends and rests on multiple factors. According to the Rutaganda Chamber, the nexus
requirement is not black and white and does not depend solely on a direct and definite nexus
between conduct and the armed conflict. The Rutaganda Chamber developed a deeper analysis,
following the Kunarac nexus application, which allows for a broader interpretation of the nexus
application.
In Rutaganda, the appeal and guilt of Rutaganda depended on whether or not the nexus
requirement was met. The Appeals Chamber found that “no reasonable trier of fact could have
concluded … that the Prosecution failed to establish a nexus between the acts committed by
Rutaganda and the armed conflict.”51 In fact, the Appeals Chamber held that the nexus
requirement was met by the Prosecution, by showing Rutaganda’s participation in the killings at
Nyanza and the armed conflict.52 As a result, the Appeals Chamber held that it was established,
beyond a reasonable doubt, that Rutaganda was individually reasonable for the crimes
committed.53 Ultimately, the Appeals Chamber found Rutaganda guilty of multiple counts of the
Indictment.54
As we can see in Rutaganda, there would have been a different outcome if the Appeals
Chamber tribunal stayed with and utilized the narrower application of the nexus requirement.
Just as it occurred in the Trial Chamber, Rutaganda would have been exonerated from guilt in
relation to multiple counts on an international scale if the Appeals Chamber utilized the narrower
nexus requirement. This is a perfect example of a case where the decision rested on the nexus
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requirement. Rutaganda committed serious and heinous crimes under international criminal law.
Yet, if the tribunal utilized the narrower application, he would have not been held accountable
for multiple charges of the Indictment. However, once the Appeals Chamber utilized the broader
construction of the nexus requirement, the Chamber found Rutaganda guilty for multiple counts.
As we can see, a broader test to determine if there is a nexus between conduct (a crime
committed) and an armed conflict better suits the international criminal law goal of justice and
holding those who commit war crimes accountable. A broader application of the nexus
requirement is the better option when determining if a war crime has been committed. However,
there may be pushback and drawbacks of a broader definition application of the nexus
requirement when determining if a war crime has been committed, as I will examine in the next
section.

Potential Pushback and Drawbacks of Broader Applications of the Nexus Requirement
As shown, the international tribunals have used both narrow and broader applications of
the nexus requirement when determining whether a war crime has been committed. Although I
advocate for a broader application to allow for more opportunities for justice, there may be
potential pushback to this expansion. Specifically, there are potential drawbacks to the use of a
broader application of the nexus requirement. First and foremost, a potential drawback or
pushback against a broader application of the nexus requirement could be that the definition
becomes expanded and broadened too far.
Taking an example from earlier: if an officer were to harm a subordinate during an armed
conflict, under the narrow definition and application of the nexus requirement this action would
not necessarily alone constitute a war crime. The reason it would not constitute a war crime,
under a narrow nexus requirement, is because the crime and conduct did not have a direct or
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definite link to the armed conflict. In this example, the officer did not harm or attack the
subordinate because of or motivated by or even related to the armed conflict. The armed conflict
in this case could be entirely unrelated to the crime. This is potentially harmful because the
expansion of the definition of war crime may then include too much. Parties then may attempt to
prosecute individuals under war crimes for crimes or conduct that are almost entirely unrelated to
the armed conflict. This is also potentially harmful because this could bring in countless other
cases against individual defendants that flood the international tribunals. It would be harmful to
overwhelm the tribunals with countless potential cases that likely do not constitute war crimes
because we favor a broader application of the nexus requirement. These are sincere potential
consequences that must be considered.
If tribunals made the definition and application of the nexus requirement too broad, an
occurrence like this could potentially fall under the war crime category. Although this would be
an extreme example of the broadened nexus requirement reaching too far, this example would
lead to problematic results because it may allow for too many unrelated crimes to be considered
as war crimes. However, if tribunals were to consider the nexus requirement in a broader context,
it would likely still only include crimes that were motivated by or related to the armed conflict.
This far-reaching example would likely be nothing more than a fear of opponents of expanding
the nexus requirement. There could be some validity to the pushback if the definition expanded
further than the broader nexus tests under Kunarac. The best case scenario for all parties would
be to follow the Kunarac nexus test for determining if a war crime has occurred.
Additionally, another point of contention with expanding the definition and application of
the nexus requirement is the potential effect on the seriousness of prosecuting war crimes. A core
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attribute of a war crime is that the violation of international humanitarian law must be serious.55
As an important attribute of war crimes, “severity is consistently identified by tribunals and
scholars as a requirement of war crimes.”56 In fact, “severity is so central to defining a war crime
that it has sometimes been treated by tribunals as a stand-in for ‘criminalization.’”57
Seriousness holds great value in defining and prosecuting war crimes. The severity
element is considered “essential” to a war crime.58 Since severity and seriousness play an
important and crucial role in prosecuting war crimes, tribunals will be resistant to accept war
crimes that do not meet a level of severity. This works both in favor of and in conflict with the
argument that the nexus requirement should be broadened.
The severity and seriousness requirement for war crimes may be impeded or affected if
the nexus requirement becomes broader and more relaxed. If the tribunals broaden the nexus
requirement, the severity and seriousness of the crimes considered for prosecution may lessen or
weaken. If there is less required to show a nexus between crimes and armed conflict, this may
reduce the severity of the crimes committed. This could potentially swoop in and allow for
crimes that lack a severe or serious quality. Once again using the example of the officer harming
the subordinate. If this example somehow passed a broader application of the nexus requirement,
this example would also affect the severity requirement as well. Either the severity element
would have to be broadened as well - and potentially weakened – or this example would pass the
nexus requirement but not the severity element.
However, in direct contrast, the importance of the severity element strengthens the
argument that the nexus requirement should be broadened because the severity element provides
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a check on the nexus requirement. If the nexus requirement becomes too broad and too relaxed,
the severity element will still be there to provide a check. If a crime passes the nexus
requirement, it still needs to meet the standard for severity and seriousness. This almost becomes
a two-step process and allows for a second check if the nexus requirement becomes broadened.
Finally, an additional pushback against broadening the nexus requirement may be that
other crimes, such as crimes against humanity, may serve to capture grave offenses that do not
have a nexus requirement. My response to this would be that individuals, especially during
armed conflict with emotions soaring, should and need to be held accountable for all of their
actions and conduct. We should not limit definitions and applications of portions of these
offenses, in the hope that other potential crime charges suffice. Crimes, such as crimes against
humanity, should not be relied upon as a “catchall.” On an international scale, we should charge
individuals for crimes committed during armed conflict using broader, yet fair definitions.
Similarly, another pushback may be that some crimes may still be prosecuted
domestically, holding individuals accountable on a domestic level. My response to this point
would be similar to the point immediately above. International tribunals were established to
handle the most serious, intricate, and heinous crimes. These tribunals exist to handle crimes like
war crimes, and the most serious crimes of concern to the international community. The nexus
requirement should not be the only thing standing in the way.
In summary, at times, international tribunals have used a narrow definition and
application of the nexus requirement when determining if a war crime has occurred. However,
international tribunals should use a broader and more fluid definition and application of the
nexus requirement to determine if a war crime has occurred. However, as shown in this section,
advocates of a narrower interpretation of the nexus requirement may be concerned with
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broadening the definition in fear that the expansion may lead to a potential effect on the
seriousness of war crimes, or a concern that the definition may become expanded too far.
Conclusion
The nexus requirement used to determine if a war crime has been committed has proven
to be too narrow and too strict. The tribunals’ use of a narrow nexus requirement, which requires
a direct and definite link between the conduct of the crime and the armed conflict, presents a
serious problem of limiting the scope of cases that constitute war crimes. The narrow application
too quickly eliminates a wide array of cases from being charged as war crimes, since it
exonerates potentially guilty parties under international humanitarian law if the nexus
requirement is not met. However, a relaxed, broader, and more expanded definition and
application of the nexus requirement would allow for a larger amount and a wider net of serious
crimes to be classified as war crimes.
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